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WHEN THE GOVERNOR LEGISLATES:
POST-ENACTMENT BUDGET CHANGES
AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
IN NEVADA
Joanna M. Myers*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Nevada State Governor is the elected supreme executive of the state
and is charged with ensuring state law is “faithfully” executed.1  This responsi-
bility includes overseeing the execution of budgetary law, enacted as appropria-
tions.2  The Nevada Constitution requires that these spending appropriations
not exceed a balanced budget,3 thereby necessitating adjustments to spending
when tax revenue projections fall short of budgeted spending.4  In 2008, when
the Legislature was out of session, Governor Jim Gibbons attempted to unilat-
erally cut 2007 spending appropriations in order to balance the budget in light
of falling tax revenues.  His 2008 order called for a 4.5% reduction of spending
by all departments.5  Although Governor Gibbons claimed statutory authoriza-
tion to make the cuts without consulting the Legislature, key legislators
objected.6  Critics characterized his order as a violation of Nevada’s separation
of powers.  They argued that the statute, or at least the Governor’s interpreta-
tion of it, amounted to an unconstitutional grant of a post-enactment veto
power.7  When State Controller Kim Wallin, relying on an Attorney General
Opinion, refused to implement the order without legislative consultation and
approval, the Governor acquiesced to the Legislators’ complaints.  He submit-
ted his cuts to the Legislature’s Interim Finance Committee (“IFC”), which
* William S. Boyd School of Law, J.D. candidate, May 2010.  I thank Professor Tuan
Samahon, Senator Bob Coffin, and State Controller Kim Wallin for their comments as I
drafted and revised this Note.
1 NEV. CONST. art. V, §§ 1, 7.
2 Id.; see generally NEV. REV. STAT. § 353 (2007).
3 DIV. OF BUDGET & PLANNING, NEV. DEP’T OF ADMIN., BUDGET 101—INTRODUCTION TO
STATE BUDGETING 2 (6th ed. 2009), available at http://budget.state.nv.us/Bud101Man/
budget_101_manual_6th_ed.pdf.
4 NEV. CONST. art. IX, § 2, cl. 1.
5 Press Release, Jim Gibbons, Governor of Nev., Governor Announces 4.5% Reductions to
State Budget (Dec. 14, 2007), available at http://gov.state.nv.us/PressReleases/2007/2007-
12-14_ReductionsStateBudget.htm.
6 Letter from Bob Coffin, Nev. State Senator, to Randolph Townsend, Nev. State Senator
(Jan. 21, 2008), reprinted in Cy Ryan, Left Out of the Loop, Lawmakers Mull Suing to
Overturn Gibbons’ Budget Cuts, LAS VEGAS SUN, Jan. 23, 2008, http://www.lasvegassun.
com/news/2008/jan/23/left-out-loop-democratic-lawmakers-mull-suing-gibb/.
7 Id.
229
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subsequently approved the reduction.8  The parties resolved the conflict with-
out separation of powers litigation.
Although the Governor and IFC temporarily averted a constitutional crisis,
it again reached the boiling point in August of 2009 when the Governor issued
an Executive Order announcing his plan to unilaterally spend federal stimulus
money without approval from the IFC.9  The Governor acted in response to
State Controller Wallin’s refusal to implement work program changes designed
to spend the stimulus money because she claimed that the revisions lacked IFC
approval as required by Nevada Revised Statutes (“NRS”) section 353.220.10
In an opinion issued the same day as the Governor’s Executive Order, the
Attorney General sanctioned the Governor’s claim that he has the sole and
broad discretion to spend the money under Nevada law if he alone determines
the spending is necessary for the protection of life or property.11  The Attorney
General stated further that the State Controller should comply with his requests
and process the funds without prior approval from the IFC.12  Essentially, this
authorization provided the Governor with “carte blanche” power to unilaterally
spend over $2.2 billion dollars.13
Unless properly addressed by the Legislature or settled by the Supreme
Court of Nevada, the likelihood is great that this separation of powers conflict
will continue to escalate.  Because executive officers are not bound by the
Attorney General’s Opinions,14 future governors could simply choose to revive
past precedent and continue the practice of cutting budgets and demanding
reserves, or follow in Governor Gibbons’s footsteps, spending federal funds in
derogation of enacted budgets and without legislative approval.  Moreover, the
political process may prove an inadequate safeguard for securing the separation
of powers.  Future key players in the executive and legislative branches may be
reluctant to check an aggrandizing or encroaching Governor, thereby permitting
an executive to claim control of law-making functions.  Accordingly, this Note
addresses two key questions.  First, it addresses whether Governor Gibbons’s
8 See Press Release, Jim Gibbons, Governor of Nev., Legislative Committee Approves
Budget Cuts (May 23, 2008), available at http://gov.state.nv.us/PressReleases/2008/PDF/Pr-
2008-05-23-IFC-Approval.pdf; Press Release, Jim Gibbons, Governor of Nev., Governor
Submits Spending Reductions to Legislative Panel (May 9, 2008), available at http://
gov.state.nv.us/PressReleases/2008/2008-05-09-IFCSubmission.htm.
9 See Exec. Order by the Governor Implementing the Provisions of the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act of 2009 in the State of Nevada (Aug. 14, 2009), available at http://
gov.state.nv.us/EO/2009/EO-2009-08-14_ARRA.pdf.
10 NEV. REV. STAT. § 353.220 (2007); Press Release, Jim Gibbons, Governor of Nev., Gov-
ernor Reports on Stimulus Funding as Required by Law (Aug. 24, 2009), available at http://
gov.state.nv.us/PressReleases/2009/2009-08-24_IFC.htm; Letter from Kim Wallin, Nev.
State Controller, to Lorne J. Malkiewich, Sec’y to Interim Fin. Comm. (Aug. 19, 2009),
available at http://media.lasvegassun.com/media/pdfs/blogs/documents/2009/08/21/Control-
ler_Letter_August_20_2009__IFC.pdf.
11 Letter from Catherine Cortez Masto, Nev. Attorney Gen., to Kim Wallin, Nev. State
Controller 2-3 (Aug. 24, 2009), available at http://media.lasvegassun.com/media/pdfs/blogs/
documents/2009/08/24/AG_Opinion_8-24-09.pdf.
12 Id. at 3.
13 David McGrath Schwartz, As Gibbons Gains Power, Lawmakers See Danger, LAS
VEGAS SUN, Aug. 25, 2009, at 1, available at http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2009/aug/
25/gibbons-gains-power-lawmakers-see-danger/.
14 Cannon v. Taylor, 493 P.2d 1313, 1314 (Nev. 1972).
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attempt to unilaterally cut the budget violates Nevada law and the Nevada Con-
stitution.  Second, it addresses whether the Governor’s continued spending of
federal stimulus money pursuant to allegedly delegated authority also violates
Nevada law and the presentment requirements of the Nevada Constitution.
Alternatively, would a Nevada statute granting the Governor power to unilater-
ally increase, reduce, or withhold the budget of state agencies constitute an
excessive and unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the Governor?
These questions are of paramount importance as the 2007 revenue projec-
tions were mere harbingers of difficulty to come.  Exacerbated by the mortgage
crisis, by August of 2008, Nevada’s deficit had grown to twenty-one percent of
Nevada’s overall budget and the situation has continued to decline throughout
2009.15  The current Governor, as well as those that hold the office in the
future, will need an appropriate and constitutional means to deal efficiently
with deficiencies in anticipated revenues, unforeseen budget crises, and the
spending of federal stimulus money.  Accordingly, this Note attempts to answer
these questions through a multi-faceted and detailed discussion examining
Nevada’s current budgetary law, the historical background and text of the
Nevada Constitution, doctrines of constitutional interpretation and statutory
construction, and the approach taken by other state high courts and the U.S.
Supreme Court in answering similar constitutional challenges.  Part II begins
by detailing the political controversy surrounding Governor Gibbons’s unsuc-
cessful efforts to implement cuts to the state budget without legislative
approval and the most recent controversy over his spending of federal stimulus
money.  Part III discusses the constitutional requirements regarding the creation
of laws and the apparent conflict in Nevada’s existing statutes governing revi-
sions and the setting aside of reserves.  Part IV examines the historical back-
drop for the drafting of the Nevada State Constitution and its importance to a
meaningful interpretation of constitutional provisions.  Part V addresses the
potential approaches to the interpretation of state constitutional provisions and
identifies the approach taken in this Note.  Part VI contains a comparison of the
current constitutional issue with Nevada precedent, decisions by the U.S.
Supreme Court, and the outcomes of similar constitutional challenges from
other state jurisdictions.  Part VII presents possible alternative solutions that
may be enacted to circumvent future conflicts.  Part VIII concludes with some
final thoughts.
II. CATALYST FOR CRISIS:  THE NEVADA STATE BUDGET PROCESS & THE
FEDERAL STIMULUS PROGRAM
The economic downturn in Nevada became the catalyst for a potential
constitutional crisis in late 2007.  Indeed, state revenues were suffering and
projections estimated the state coffer would be drastically short during fiscal
years 2007-2008 and 2008-2009.16  By October 2007, sales tax revenue for the
15 Juliet Williams, States Face Tough Choices as Budget Crisis Deepens, USA TODAY, July
31, 2008, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-07-31-3490075796_x.
htm.
16 Press Release, Jim Gibbons, Governor of Nev., supra note 5.
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2007 fiscal year was already down over $6.5 million.17  In response, Nevada
Governor Jim Gibbons asked state offices, agencies, and departments to pre-
pare an eight percent reduction in spending.18  After reviewing the severe
impact such a large cut would have on state services, the Governor announced
he would require a lower, broad-based reduction of 4.5% in general fund appro-
priations.19  Rather than cutting individual programs, the Governor requested a
reduction in nearly all state agencies’ funding.20  Additionally, this plan called
for the withdrawal of up to $200 million from the Fund to Stabilize the Opera-
tion of the State Government (aka The Rainy Day Fund) to be used during the
2009 fiscal year.21  The Governor officially released his adjustments to the
state budget in January 2008, at which time revenue projections estimated the
budget was shy nearly $517 million.22
Legislative reactions to Governor Gibbon’s reductions were anything but
tepid.  The impassioned debate paralleled partisan politics.  In a letter to
Republican State Senator Randolph Townsend, the Chairman of the Legislative
Commission, Democratic State Senator Bob Coffin characterized the Republi-
can Governor’s actions as an unconstitutional line item veto of the budget.23
Specifically, Senator Coffin expressed his concern that inaction on the part of
the Legislature could result in an unintentional ratification of gubernatorial line
item veto, a power not granted to the Governor in Nevada’s Constitution.24  In
part, Senator Coffin’s dissatisfaction relied on the fact that the Governor pur-
portedly failed to comply with Assembly Bill 628, the Appropriation Act, as he
had failed to provide any notice of the reductions to the Legislature.25  Conse-
quently, Senator Coffin called on the Legislative Commission to serve notice
on the Governor, informing him that the Commission would seek legal action if
he continued his efforts to unilaterally cut the state budget.26  Senator Town-
send, reluctant to sue the Governor, agreed to share the letter with the Legisla-
tive Commission, but argued that the appropriate measure was to revise the
statutes.27  Expressing similar concerns, State Assembly Speaker Barbara
Buckley (Democrat) and State Assemblywoman Sheila Leslie (Democrat)
joined Senator Coffin and stressed that substantial budget cuts should include
consultation with the Legislature.  Speaker Buckley further stated that the Gov-
17 Press Release, Jim Gibbons, Governor of Nev., Governor Gibbons’ Statement Regarding
Current Fiscal Budget Projections (Oct. 22, 2007), available at http://gov.state.nv.us/Press
Releases/2007/2007-10-22GovernorStatementBudgetProjections.htm.
18 Press Release, Jim Gibbons, Governor of Nev., supra note 5.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Press Release, Jim Gibbons, Governor of Nev., Governor Gibbons Announces Adjust-
ments to State Budget (Jan. 11, 2008), available at http://gov.state.nv.us/PressReleases/
2008/2008-01-11BudgetReport.htm.
23 Letter from Bob Coffin, Nev. State Senator, to Randolph Townsend, Nev. State Senator,
supra note 6.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Ryan, supra note 6, at 2.
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ernor was denying the public and its lawmakers an opportunity to voice their
opinions about the reductions.28
Despite mounting tensions, the crisis was temporarily averted due to the
nature of Nevada’s non-unitary executive.29  In particular, elected State Con-
troller Kim Wallin (Democrat) refused to implement the reductions immedi-
ately following their January 2008 release by Governor Gibbons.30  Citing
conflicting statutes as the reason for not carrying out the cuts, she awaited an
opinion from the State Attorney General’s Office.31  Specifically, she sought
interpretation of NRS section 353.225 and its apparent conflict with NRS sec-
tion 353.220.32  NRS section 353.225 authorizes the Chief of Budget Division,
in order to meet fiscal emergencies, with written approval of the Governor, to
require the State Controller or head of each department to set aside a reserve.33
However, NRS section 353.220 requires prior legislative approval on work pro-
gram changes that result in a more than ten percent or $50,000 change in appro-
priated funds, whichever is less.34  Controller Wallin characterized the
Attorney General Opinion she received as requiring the reductions be approved
by the Legislature or the IFC and, accordingly, refused to implement the budget
cuts.35
Governor Gibbons, not willing to change a precedent he believed that pre-
vious governors already established, requested an Attorney General Opinion of
his own.36  Subsequently, on May 9, 2008, the Governor announced that he
would submit his budget reductions to the IFC based on the Attorney General’s
Opinion stating he should do so, despite a long-standing practice that neither
the Legislature nor its IFC had previously required approval for the Governor’s
such changes.37  Notably, two weeks later, the IFC approved the Governor’s
4.5% across the board cut to the current budget.38  In June of 2008, the Gover-
nor called for an off-year special session to address the state’s continued
shortfall.39  The special session lasted only twelve hours and resulted in a
28 Id. at 1.
29 See NEV. CONST. art. V, §§ 1, 17, 19.
30 Geoff Dornan, Cuts Ordered Weeks Ago Still Not Posted to Agency Budgets, NEV.
APPEAL, Feb. 11, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nevadaappeal.com/article/20080211/
NEWS/808528020/0/FRONTPAGE.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 NEV. REV. STAT. § 353.225 (2007).
34 Id. § 353.220.
35 Sean Whaley, Gibbons Seeks Ruling on Budget Cut Proposal, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Apr.
26, 2008, at 3B, available at http://www.lvrj.com/news/18252444.html.
36 Id.
37 Press Release, Jim Gibbons, Governor of Nev., Governor Submits Spending Reductions
to Legislative Panel, supra note 8.
38 Press Release, Jim Gibbons, Governor of Nev., Legislative Committee Approves Budget
Cuts, supra note 8.  The constitutionality of the IFC itself is beyond the scope of this paper.
39 Press Release, Jim Gibbons, Governor of Nev., Governor to Call Special Session (June
13, 2008), available at http://gov.state.nv.us/PressReleases/2008/2008-06-13SpecialSession.
htm.
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budget agreement that passed in both houses and was enacted by the
Governor.40
Seemingly settled for a short time, the bitter controversy over who has
power over spending came to a head again in August of 2009, as evidenced by
a series of cantankerous disagreements between the Governor and the IFC over
how to spend federal stimulus money and the staff that would oversee it.41
Striking down Governor Gibbons’s proposal to add ten staff to oversee stimu-
lus money spending and rejecting the Housing Division’s plan to spend $10.5
million for weatherizing homes, the IFC clearly demonstrated its intent to have
legislative involvement in the spending.42  In addition, the IFC refused to pro-
vide the Governor’s office with an American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
(“ARRA”) director as requested; instead, it created a position under the author-
ity of the executive branch’s State Controller.43  According to Governor Gib-
bons, lawmakers “stuck their partisan political noses in the middle of it and
screwed everything up.”44  Moreover, the Governor threatened to challenge the
authority of the IFC and proceeded to establish the position of ARRA Director
through an executive order.45
In a further effort to bypass the IFC and spend the $2.2 billion in federal
stimulus money granted to the state under the ARRA, Governor Gibbons sub-
mitted work programs to State Controller Kim Wallin that exceeded the limits
permitted in NRS section 353.220 and thus, in the Controller’s opinion,
required IFC approval.46  Attempting to comply with state law, Controller Wal-
lin forwarded the work programs to the IFC and sought an opinion from the
State Attorney General to guide her in the future.47  Subsequently, the Attorney
General addressed two questions:  1) “Do these work programs require Interim
Finance approval as is usually required for work programs of this magnitude
under NRS 353.220 since it is by Executive Order,” and 2) “Is the Governor’s
declaration of necessity for the ‘protection of life or property’ sufficient to per-
mit the Controller to process these work programs without approval of the
40 Press Release, Jim Gibbons, Governor of Nev., The Governor Issued the Following State-
ment Today After Signing the Bills from the Special Session Balancing the Budget for the
Remainder of the Biennium (June 30, 2008), available at http://gov.state.nv.us/Press-
Releases/2008/2008-06-30-SigningStatement.htm; 2008 Legislature Special Session Ends
After 12 Hours, LAS VEGAS REV. J., June 27, 2008, http://www.lvrj.com/news/22266679.
html.
41 David McGrath Schwartz, Legislature Reins in Gibbons, LAS VEGAS SUN, Aug. 5, 2009,
at 1, available at http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2009/aug/05/legislature-reins-gibbons/.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 1-2; Press Release, Jim Gibbons, Governor of Nev., Governor Signs Executive
Order to Take Control of Stimulus Funds (Aug. 14, 2009), available at http://gov.state.nv.us/
PressReleases/2009/2009-08-14_EO_Stimulus.htm.
44 Schwartz, supra note 41.
45 Exec. Order by the Governor Implementing the Provisions of the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009 in the State of Nevada (Aug. 14, 2009), available at http://
gov.state.nv.us/EO/2009/EO-2009-08-14_ARRA.pdf; Press Release, Jim Gibbons, Governor
of Nev., Talking Points for ARRA Press Release (Aug. 14, 2009), available at http://
gov.state.nv.us/PressReleases/2009/PDF/STIMULUS_IFC_TALKING_POINTS.pdf.
46 Schwartz, supra note 13; Letter from Kim Wallin, Nev. State Controller, to Lorne J.
Malkiewich, Sec’y to Interim Fin. Comm., supra note 10.
47 Id.; Letter from Catherine Cortez Masto, Nev. Attorney Gen., to Kim Wallin, Nev. State
Controller, supra note 11, at 1.
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Interim Finance Committee as is usually required for work programs of this
magnitude under NRS 353.220?”48  The Attorney General concluded that if the
Governor declares the work programs to be for the “protection of life or prop-
erty,” he need not submit changes to work programs to the IFC, even for
changes of such magnitude.49
Furthermore, the Attorney General stated that NRS sections
353.220(5)(a)-(b) “place the discretion solely with the Governor to determine
that, due to an emergency or for the protection of life or property, immediate
action is necessary requiring the revision of a work program.”50  Even though
NRS section 353.220(5)(a) requires the Governor report the reason for his
actions to the IFC at its next meeting following the action, the Governor’s
report is purely informational because, by that point, the money is spent.51
Although the “protection of life or property” provision has historically been
invoked only during natural disasters or like circumstances,52 the Attorney
General’s Opinion arguably provides the Governor with unchecked power to
spend whenever he deems fit.53  This is a monumental expansion of the Gover-
nor’s spending power and he, as well as future governors, may choose to cite
this authority and avoid the well-founded tenet that “the power of controlling
the public purse lies within legislative, not executive authority.”54
These conflicts are not unique to Nevada.55  As states struggle to adjust to
revenue shortfalls, legislators and executive officers are likely to continue to
clash over who has the power to spend the federal stimulus and other federal
funds.  In Nevada, the debates and separation of powers issues that these con-
flicts invoke are unlikely to be settled without a determination from the
Supreme Court of Nevada.
III. STATUTORY CONFLICT:  THE BIRTH AND REVISION OF AN
APPROPRIATIONS BILL
To fully understand the conflicts that arose over the Governor’s proposed
budget cuts and stimulus spending, one must take a precursory look at the cur-
rent state of Nevada’s budgetary law.  The State Budget Act governs budget
formation and revision.56  Nevada operates on a biennial budget cycle with the
fiscal year beginning annually on July 1st.57  Each biennium, the Legislature
enacts two annual appropriations.58  Nevada is one of only eleven states operat-
48 Id.
49 Letter from Catherine Cortez Masto, Nev. Attorney Gen., to Kim Wallin, Nev. State
Controller, supra note 11, at 1-2.
50 Id. at 2 (citing Nev. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 2006-01 (2006)).
51 NEV. REV. STAT. § 353.220(5)(a) (2007); Schwartz, supra note 13.
52 Schwartz, supra note 13.
53 Id.
54 State Employees Ass’n v. Daines, 824 P.2d 276, 279 (Nev. 1992).
55 See Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, General Overview of Legislative v. Executive
Appropriations Issues, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=18190 (last visited Feb. 28,
2010); see also Patrick McGreevy, Steinberg to Take Governor to Court, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
8, 2009, at A7.
56 NEV. REV. STAT. § 353.220.
57 DIV. OF BUDGET & PLANNING, NEV. DEP’T OF ADMIN., supra note 3, at 2.
58 Id.
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ing in this fashion; thirty states convene annually to enact annual budgets; nine
states convene annually to create two-year appropriations.59  The Nevada
method gives the Legislature more time to concentrate on policy issues rather
than budgetary details and enhances stability among state agencies through
long range planning.60  However, the biennial system provides less oversight
and supervision of executive branch activities and puts the Legislature at a dis-
advantage when quick adjustments to actual revenue deficiencies are
required.61  Compounding the potential disadvantages of biennial appropria-
tions is the fact that Nevada’s Constitution requires the state operate on a bal-
anced budget, a requirement taken seriously by Governor Gibbons.62
Budget formation begins with an executive budget created by synthesizing
the Governor’s priorities, agency funding requests, and available funding.63
The Governor’s Executive Budget outlines his goals and is considered to be a
policy document.64  The Governor submits this document to the Legislative
Counsel Bureau’s Fiscal Staff two weeks prior to the regular biennial conven-
ing of the Legislature during which time necessary hearings are held with legis-
lative money committees.65  Upon the beginning of the session, joint
subcommittees comprised of four members of each house thoroughly review
the budgets, making any necessary recommendations prior to the formalization
of the Legislatively Approved Budget Document.66  The full money commit-
tees then vote to accept the budget, accept with modifications, or reject the
entire budget and implement their own.67  Next, an appropriations bill must
pass the Legislature through the same bicameral and presentment process as
other bills:  by approval of a majority of both houses followed by presentment
to the Governor for his approval or veto in its entirety.68  A two-thirds vote of
the total members in both houses is required to override a gubernatorial veto.69
Once the Governor or Legislature enacts the appropriations bill, NRS section
353.220 (Revisions), NRS section 353.225 (Reserves), and the Assembly Bill
applicable to the current budgetary period govern changes to that appropria-
tions bill.70
59 Id.
60 Id. at 3.
61 Id.
62 NEV. CONST. art. IX, § 2, cl. 1; see Press Release, Jim Gibbons, Governor of Nev., supra
note 10.
63 DIV. OF BUDGET & PLANNING, NEV. DEP’T OF ADMIN., supra note 3, at 5, 7.
64 Id. at 5.
65 Id. at 7-8.  The “money committees” are the Senate Committee on Finance and the
Assembly Committee on Means and Ways.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 8.
68 NEV. CONST. art. IV, §§ 18, 19, 35; MICHAEL W. BOWERS, THE NEVADA STATE CONSTI-
TUTION:  A REFERENCE GUIDE 59 (1993).
69 NEV. CONST. art. IV, § 35.
70 NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 353.220, 353.225 (2007); Assem. 562 § 64, 2009 Leg., 75th Gen.
Sess. (Nev. 2009); Assem. 628 § 67, 2007 Leg., 74th Gen. Sess. (Nev. 2007).
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A. NRS Section 353.220 Procedure for Revision of Work Programs and
Allotment
It is the revision process that gave rise to the current conflicts.  NRS sec-
tion 353.220 provides the procedure for revision of work programs and allot-
ments.71  A work program is the proposed work plan of an administrative
agency during a particular period.72  The term “work program” is also used to
refer to an amendment to the Legislatively Approved Budget.73  NRS section
353.220 states that agencies may submit a written request to the Governor
(through the Chief of Budget Division) for the revision of its department’s
work program at any time during the fiscal year if necessary.74  Whenever a
revision in an amount above $20,000 would increase or decrease the expendi-
ture level approved by the Legislature of any of the allotments within the work
program by ten percent or $50,000 (whichever is less), the request must be
approved by the IFC, which has forty-five days to consider the revision.75  If
not considered within the forty-five day period, the revision is deemed
approved.76  Additionally, if the Governor determines expedited action is
required, he may so certify and the IFC has only fifteen days to consider the
revision.77
The law requires presentment to the IFC unless the Governor deems the
revision necessary because of an emergency or for the protection of life or
property.78  When the Governor acts upon an emergency, he must simply report
his actions to the IFC at its next meeting, along with his reasons for determin-
ing that action was necessary.79  An emergency pursuant to this statute means
“invasion, disaster, insurrection, riot, breach of the peace, substantial threat to
life or property, epidemic or the imminent danger thereof.”80  A qualifying
emergency also includes damage or disintegration of state owned buildings or
their electrical or mechanical systems if immediate repairs are necessary to
maintain the buildings’ integrity.81  In this way, the law grants the Governor
flexibility to respond quickly when needed.
B. NRS Section 353.225 Procedure for Reserves
NRS section 353.225 states that “in order to provide some flexibility to
meet emergencies arising during each fiscal year . . . and for operation and
maintenance of the various departments, institutions, and agencies” the Gover-
nor may require the heads of departments or the state controller to set aside a
71 NEV. REV. STAT. § 353.220.
72 BUDGET & PLANNING DIV., DEP’T OF ADMIN., WORK PROGRAM MANUAL:  A COMPRE-
HENSIVE GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING AND IMPLEMENTING WORK PROGRAMS IN THE STATE OF
NEVADA 30 (4th ed. 2006), available at http://budget.state.nv.us/WrkPrgmManual/work_
program_manual_4th_edition_R1.pdf.
73 Id. at 5.
74 NEV. REV. STAT. § 353.220.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. § 353.263.
81 Id.
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reserve from the funds appropriated in an amount as the chief of budget divi-
sion may determine.82  A reserve is made up of funds that are available to be
carried forward to the next fiscal year or which may be returned to the reserve
for future obligations.83  The conflicts between NRS sections 353.220 and
353.225 induced Controller Wallin to seek a legal opinion from the State Attor-
ney General regarding the 4.5% cuts.84
Although the Legislature enacted NRS sections 353.225 and 353.220
together, section 353.225 makes no reference of, and is separated textually
from NRS section 353.220.85  Furthermore, NRS section 353.225 does not pro-
vide for involvement by the Legislature or IFC, nor does it add extraneous
terms, guidelines, or parameters.86  In addition, historically, reserves were
treated differently than the work programs revisions governed by NRS section
353.220 and governors were given great deference in creating reserves.87  In
fact, the Legislature did not add the requirement to NRS section 353.220 that
the IFC approve work programs until 1979; thus, Nevada law previously per-
mitted governors unilateral discretion to implement changes to both reserves
and work programs.88
The Work Program Manual prepared by the Department of Administration
Budget and Planning Division also evinces this historical gubernatorial discre-
tion.  Specifically, this manual contains instructions on how to determine if a
work program requires submission to the IFC.89  For example, the Department
of Administration’s Work Program Packet Checklist form contains a section
where an applicant indicates the reason why the work program does not require
IFC approval; among the choices is the statement “[i]ncreases revenue and
places funds in reserve only.”90  Appendix E of the Work Program Manual
contains a Work Program Checklist and also includes a box “places funds in
reserve only,” again indicating that this option does not require IFC approval.91
C. Analysis of the Current Conflict
Although both situations invoke the same statutory and constitutional
dilemmas, there are essentially two separate issues to analyze.  First, if success-
ful, would Governor Gibbons’s attempt at unilaterally cutting the budget have
resulted in a violation of state law and the Nevada Constitution’s separation of
powers and bicameralism requirements?  Second, is the Governor’s unilateral
spending of federal stimulus funds violative of the same provisions?
82 Id. § 353.225.
83 BUDGET & PLANNING DIV., DEP’T OF ADMIN., supra note 72, at 28.
84 Dornan, supra note 30.
85 NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 353.220, 353.225.
86 Id. § 353.225.
87 Press Release, Jim Gibbons, Governor of Nev., Governor Submits Spending Reductions
to Legislative Panel, supra note 8.
88 See Act of May 15, 1979, ch. 364, 1979 Nev. Stat. 609-10.
89 BUDGET & PLANNING DIV., DEP’T OF ADMIN., supra note 72, at 43-44.
90 Id. at 43.
91 Id. at 44.
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1. Governor Gibbons’s 2007 Proposed Budget Cuts
There is no evidence that the Governor’s attempted 4.5% reductions in
2007 were ever purported to satisfy the emergency exception under NRS sec-
tion 353.220.  Therefore, facially, it appears the Governor’s unilateral demand
for reducing agency spending by 4.5% violated NRS section 353.220 requiring
IFC approval.  The 4.5% reductions would have resulted in a decrease in the
expenditure level approved by the Legislature well over the $50,000 limit, and
thus required IFC approval.92  However, it can be argued that the characteriza-
tion of the spending reductions may have a significant impact on whether a
violation would have actually occurred.
On January 11, 2008, Governor Gibbons characterized the reduction in
spending as an adjustment to the state budget, in effect a work program, sub-
jecting the cuts to NRS section 353.220.93  If successful, such cuts would have
violated section 353.220.  If, however, Governor Gibbons’s demand for a
reduction in spending was simply a demand to set aside a reserve, the gov-
erning statute is NRS section 353.225.94  In fact, on May 9, 2008, the Governor
indeed referred to his 4.5% adjustment as the setting aside of reserves.95  In
doing so, the Governor sought to rely on the “long standing practice and proce-
dure that neither the Legislature nor the IFC have required their prior approval
for work programs implementing reserves.”96
It appears, when viewed in isolation, that NRS section 353.225 would not
have required the Governor to submit his demand for reserves to the IFC; there-
fore, an argument can be made that his actions are indeed consistent with the
law and previous precedent.97  However, a provision in Assembly Bill 628
enacted July 1, 2007 further complicates matters as it requires the Governor,
under specific circumstances, to submit a report to the Legislature, or, if the
Legislature is out of session, the IFC, prior to implementing reserves under
NRS section 353.225.98
When NRS section 353.225 is read in conjunction with Assembly Bill
628, section 67, the Governor’s attempted demand for reserves again appears,
on its face, to violate the statute.99  However, statutes regarding the same sub-
ject matter should be “construed so as to make each effective.”100  Unlike NRS
section 353.225, Assembly Bill 628 actually enumerates the particular circum-
stances in which it applies.101  Effective July 1, 2007, section 67 of the bill
states that if projections of the ending balance of the State General Fund, as
determined by the State Board of Examiners, is expected to fall below $80
million for Fiscal Year 2007-2008 or 2008-2009, the Governor may direct state
92 NEV. REV. STAT. § 353.220 (2007).
93 Press Release, Jim Gibbons, Governor of Nev., supra note 22.
94 NEV. REV. STAT. § 353.225.
95 Press Release, Jim Gibbons, Governor of Nev., Governor Submits Spending Reductions
to Legislative Panel, supra note 8.
96 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
97 See id.
98 Assem. 628 § 67, 2007 Leg., 74th Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2007).
99 Compare id., with NEV. REV. STAT. § 353.225.
100 City of Reno v. Stoddard, 167 P. 317, 322 (Nev. 1917) (quoting Abel v. Eggers, 136 P.
100, 103 (Nev. 1913)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
101 Assem. 628 § 67, 2007 Leg., 74th Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2007).
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agencies to set aside a reserve pursuant to NRS section 353.225.102  This
reserve may not exceed more than fifteen percent of the total amount of operat-
ing expenses or total appropriations and other money available to the depart-
ments and requires the approval of the Legislature or, if the Legislature is not in
session, the approval of the IFC.103
Part three of this provision evinces the Legislature’s intent to participate in
the setting aside of significant reserves specifically applicable to the 2007-2008
and 2008-2009 fiscal years.104  It requires the IFC’s approval and sets clear
parameters and guidelines for its application.105  However, and most signifi-
cantly, it nevertheless creates a loophole in which the Governor may act with-
out any legislative oversight.106  If reserves are set aside before the General
Fund is projected to be less than $80 million, the law apparently allows the
Governor to act pursuant to the more general statute NRS section 353.225.107
At the time the Governor sought to implement his reductions, the 2007 Fiscal
Report prepared by the Fiscal Analysis Division indicated the projected balance
of the General Fund had not yet reached the critical $80 million amount
required to trigger the requirements of Assembly Bill 628.108
Governor Gibbons’s attempted 4.5% across the board budget cuts did not
exceed the fifteen percent maximum, nor did the General Fund Balance fall
below the required limit; therefore, the enumerated specific circumstances
arguably never triggered the legislative approval requirements of Assembly Bill
628 and, accordingly, the Governor complied with the requirements of NRS
section 353.225.109  In addition, when read in a manner which gives all three
statutes effect, NRS section 353.220 would be inapplicable if Governor Gib-
bons’s demand was simply to set aside “reserves” because his attempt would
indeed be operating within a valid loophole under NRS section 353.225.110
Despite the outcome, the question remains as to whether such actions are per-
mitted by the Nevada Constitution.
2. Governor Gibbons’s 2009 Unilateral Spending of Federal Stimulus
Money
Addressing the most recent conflict, the question is whether the Governor
properly found authority under NRS section 353.220 to submit work program
102 Id.  In 2009, the same language was adopted in the Budget Act governing fiscal years
July 1, 2009 to June 30, 2010 and July 1, 2010 to June 30, 2011.  Assem. 562 § 64, 2009
Leg., 75th Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2009).
103 Assem. 628 § 67, 2007 Leg., 74th Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2007).
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 See Ryan, supra note 6.
107 Letter from Bob Coffin, Nev. State Senator, to Randolph Townsend, Nev. State Senator,
supra note 6.
108 THE FISCAL ANALYSIS DIV., LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL BUREAU, FISCAL REPORT:  SEV-
ENTY-FOURTH NEVADA LEGISLATURE 9-11 (2007), available at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/
lcb/fiscal/Fiscal%20Report/2007/SECTION%20II%20-%20GENERAL%20FUND%20
PROJECTED%20FUND%20BALANCE.pdf.
109 NEV. REV. STAT. § 353.225 (2007); see generally Press Release, Jim Gibbons, Governor
of Nev., supra note 5.
110 NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 353.220, 353.225.
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changes spending federal stimulus funds to State Controller Wallin in August
of 2009 without IFC approval.  The examination begins by looking at the lan-
guage of NRS section 353.220 relied upon by the Governor to justify his unilat-
eral spending of the ARRA federal stimulus.  The Supreme Court of Nevada
has adopted the fundamental tenets of statutory construction, the objective of
which is to give effect to the Legislature’s intent.111  First, the court examines
the plain language of the statute.  However, if the language is ambiguous or
unclear, the court construes the statute according to that which “reason and
public policy would indicate the legislature intended.”112  “Under such circum-
stances, the intent of the legislature may be determined by examining the entire
statutory scheme”113 and the interpretation should always avoid absurd
results.114  Furthermore, the intent of the Legislature prevails over the literal
sense of the words.115  In addition, statutes should be construed so as to give all
words significance, avoiding an interpretation that renders words superflu-
ous.116  Notable exceptions exist and courts may reject words as surplusage if
they are inconsistent with legislative intent, contrary to other canons of con-
struction and common sense, inadvertently inserted, or are otherwise
meaningless.117
On August 24, 2009, apparently applying the plain meaning rule of statu-
tory construction, the Attorney General stated that pursuant to NRS section
353.220(5)(a), the Governor has the discretion to declare future work program
changes concerning ARRA funds are necessary for the protection of life or
property and spend such funds without IFC approval.118  However, this inter-
pretation is fraught with problems.  First, the words “for the protection of life or
property” are ambiguous, arguably including a broad range of state activity.
Second, the words have been plucked out of the statute and the Attorney Gen-
eral is not interpreting those words within the context of the surrounding lan-
guage.  Subsections 5(a)-(c) read as follows:
5.  If a request for the revision of a work program requires additional approval as
provided in subsection 4 and:
(a)  Is necessary because of an emergency as defined in NRS 353.263 or for the
protection of life or property, the Governor shall take reasonable and proper
action to approve it and shall report the action, and his reasons for determining
that immediate action was necessary, to the Interim Finance Committee at its
first meeting after the action is taken.  Action by the Governor pursuant to this
111 Cleghorn v. Hess, 853 P.2d 1260, 1262 (Nev. 1993).
112 U.S. Design & Constr. Corp. v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 357, 50 P.3d 170, 172
(Nev. 2002) (citing Dep’t of Motor Vehicles & Pub. Safety v. Lovett, 874 P.2d 1247, 1249-
50 (Nev. 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
113 Id.
114 State Dep’t of Health, Welfare & Rehab. v. Washoe Co. Welfare Dep’t, 503 P.2d 457,
459 (Nev. 1972).
115 Id. at 458 (quoting State ex rel. O’Meara v. Ross, 14 P. 827, 828 (Nev. 1887)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
116 LINDA D. JELLUM & DAVID CHARLES HRICIK, MODERN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:
PROBLEMS, THEORIES, AND LAWYERING STRATEGIES 147 (2006).
117 Id. at 147-48.
118 NEV. REV. STAT. § 353.220 (5)(a) (2007); Letter from Catherine Cortez Masto, Nev.
Attorney Gen., to Kim Wallin, Nev. State Controller, supra note 11, at 3-4.
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paragraph constitutes approval of the revision, and other provisions of this chap-
ter requiring approval before encumbering money for the revision do not apply.
(b)  The Governor determines that the revision is necessary and requires expedi-
tious action, he may certify that the request requires expeditious action by the
Interim Finance Committee.  Whenever the Governor so certifies, the Interim
Finance Committee has 15 days after the request is submitted to its Secretary
within which to consider the revision.  Any request for revision which is not
considered within the 15-day period shall be deemed approved.
(c)  Does not qualify pursuant paragraph (a) or (b), it must be submitted to the
Interim Finance Committee.  The Interim Finance Committee has 45 days after
the request is submitted to its Secretary within which to consider the revision.
Any request which is not considered within the 45-day period shall be deemed
approved.119
Notably, subsection (a) provides two exceptions where the Governor may
act without the IFC:  in an emergency or for the protection of life or property.
Because the Legislature implements most state actions and appropriations in
order to protect Nevadans’ lives and property, reading “protection of life or
property” in isolation and applying the “plain meaning rule” could refer to any
expenditure.  Hence, this interpretation leads to absurd results because it essen-
tially allows the Governor to make any revision he wishes, at any time, so long
as he states that the revision is intended to protect life or property.120  For
example, construing the statute in this manner would allow the Governor to
spend millions in taxpayer funds to create a thousand-officer graffiti taskforce
without legislative approval, simply because it is for the protection of property.
Furthermore, subsection (b) located immediately below gives the Governor an
option to get approval of the IFC but forces the committee to act quickly when
the action is imperative.121  Therefore, an interpretation of subsection (a) that
provides the Governor such broad authority over funds necessary to protect life
or property without IFC approval essentially renders section (b) superfluous.
In addition, although she appears to have disregarded the “protection of
life or property” language, when previously asked to give an opinion on the
procedures the Governor was required to follow in revising agency work pro-
grams, the Attorney General concluded that “unless the Governor declares that
a qualifying emergency situation exists under NRS 353.220(5)(a), a revision for
a work program under section .220 must first be submitted to the IFC for
approval.”122  In making this statement, the Attorney General followed a more
logical construction and one that is harmonious with the Legislature’s intent;
subsection (a) applies to emergencies, subsection (b) applies when expedited
measures are needed, and subsection (c) applies to all other revisions.  In
August of 2009, Governor Gibbons justified his use of NRS section
353.220(5)(a)’s emergency provision to bypass the IFC by stating that progress
reports are due under ARRA by early October 2009 or else future funds may be
119 NEV. REV. STAT. § 353.220(5)(a)-(c).
120 Editorial, Checks and Balances, LAS VEGAS SUN, Aug. 26, 2009, at 4.
121 NEV. REV. STAT. § 353.220(5)(b).
122 Letter from Catherine Cortez Masto, Nev. Attorney Gen., to Jim Gibbons, Governor of
Nev. 3 (May 6, 2008).
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at risk.123  This justification is insufficient as NRS section 353.220(5)(b) pro-
vides a satisfactory mechanism for expediting the approval of the IFC the Gov-
ernor claims is needed.124  Subsection (b)’s expedited procedure would provide
the Governor IFC approval well within the reporting deadlines and thus, there
is no need to declare an emergency under subsection (a) to protect future
ARRA funds.125
Furthermore, the Legislature added section 5 to NRS section 353.220 by
Senate Bill 255 in 1979.126  The Legislature intended Senate Bill 255 to
“[s]ubstantially increase[ ] legislative control over state financial administra-
tion.”127  This 1979 original version of the statute did not include the language
“emergency” but simply “for the protection of life or property.”128  Interpreting
the provision as granting the Governor unfettered discretion to spend billions is
not what the Legislature intended because such a construction in no way effec-
tuates the three main purposes of Senate Bill 255.  As explained by Senator
Kosinski, the purposes in enacting Senate Bill 255 were increasing legislative:
1) position control; 2) control of federal funds and gifts; and 3) control over
work program revisions.129  Moreover, the Legislature added the language
“because of an emergency as defined in NRS 353.263” to NRS section 353.220
in 1991 by passing Assembly Bill 158.130  The Board of Examiners “wanted to
expand the definition of emergency, so work programs could be approved
immediately and reported later to the Interim Finance Committee.”131  In fact,
the added definition of emergency includes “substantial threat to life or prop-
erty.”132  Although NRS section 353.220’s language “because of an emergency
. . . or for the protection of life or property” is written in the disjunctive,133 they
should be read together in light of the entire provision and with the Legisla-
ture’s intent in mind.  It is not uncommon in statutory construction for courts to
interpret “or” to mean “and” when the literal meaning gives rise to an absurd
result.134  Importantly, why would the 1979 Legislature, in an effort to increase
legislative control over state finances, grant the Governor broad and sole dis-
cretion to spend funds?  A more reasonable construction of the statute is that
the Legislature gave the Governor three options for fiscal flexibility:  1) receive
authorization from the IFC within the standard forty-five days; 2) expedite IFC
approval to fifteen days if necessary; or 3) bypass IFC approval altogether in
the case of emergencies.
123 Exec. Order by the Governor Implementing the Provisions of the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act of 2009 in the State of Nevada (Aug. 14, 2009), available at http://
gov.state.nv.us/EO/2009/EO-2009-08-14_ARRA.pdf.
124 NEV. REV. STAT. § 353.220(5)(b).
125 Id.
126 1979 Nev. Stat. 609-10.
127 Minutes of the S. Comm. on Gov’t Affairs:  Hearing on S.B. 255, 1979 Leg., 60th Sess. 5
(Nev. 1979).
128 1979 Nev. Stat. 610.
129 Minutes of the Nev. State Leg. Ways & Means Comm., 1979 Leg., 60th Sess. 3 (Nev.
1979).
130 1991 Nev. Stat. 277.
131 Minutes of the S. Comm. on Fin., 1991 Leg., 66th Sess. 3 (Nev. 1991).
132 NEV. REV. STAT. § 353.263 (2007) (emphasis added).
133 Id. § 353.220(5)(a) (emphasis added).
134 JELLUM & HRICIK, supra note 116, at 65-66.
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Even if the Governor is deemed to have legislative authority to unilaterally
spend the $2.2 billion of stimulus funds, the question remains as to whether
such authority is violative of Nevada’s Constitution and its separation of pow-
ers provision.
IV. THE NEVADA CONSTITUTION:  HISTORICAL BACKDROP
Interpretation of the Nevada Constitution requires an understanding of its
historical origins.135  Nevada ratified its constitution in 1864, and is one of a
minority of states that continues to operate under its original constitution.136
The Legislature heavily adopted constitutional provisions from the constitu-
tions of both California and New York during a period when many states were
revising, and often re-revising, their constitutions.137  Revisions were so ram-
pant, in fact, that between 1800 and 1900 ninety-four new state constitutions
were adopted.138  This repeated revising demonstrates that states viewed state
constitutions as a progressive enterprise, unlike the U.S. Constitution, which,
by that time, had become venerated as the work of an “extraordinary political
generation” deserving preservation by future generations.139  In contrast, state
drafters viewed their predecessors as less experienced and looked to modern
state constitutions for guidance rather than older models such as the U.S.
Constitution.140
Additionally, state drafters approached the separation of powers problem
differently than the drafters of the U.S. Constitution.141  As a result, the Nevada
Constitution differs textually from the U.S. Constitution in several important
aspects.  The most notable is found in the Nevada Constitution’s separation of
powers clause, article III, section 1.  Just like the U.S. Constitution, article III
divides the government into three distinct departments:  the legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial; however, unlike the U.S. Constitution in which the separation
of powers is merely implied, the Nevada Constitution explicitly requires a sepa-
ration of duties between the three branches.142  Specifically, article III, section
1 states:
The powers of the Government of the State of Nevada shall be divided into three
separate departments,—the Legislative,—the Executive and the Judicial; and no per-
sons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these depart-
ments shall exercise any functions, appertaining to either of the others, except in the
cases expressly directed or permitted in this constitution.143
The effects of this clause are two-fold:  1) it requires the branches to main-
tain entirely separate duties and separate personnel thereby protecting one
135 G. Alan Tarr, Interpreting the Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 59 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 329, 329 (2003).
136 BOWERS, supra note 68, at 12.
137 Id.; G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 94 (1998).
138 TARR, supra note 137, at 94.
139 Id. at 97.
140 Id. at 98.
141 BOWERS, supra note 68, at 12.
142 NEV. CONST. art. III, § 1.
143 Id.
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branch from intrusion upon its duties by another; and 2) it prevents the delega-
tion of duties from one branch to another unless expressly permitted.144
Another notable difference distinguishing Nevada’s document from the
U.S. Constitution is that the Nevada Constitution provides for a non-unitary
executive branch.145  Unlike the hiring discretion granted to the President under
the U.S. Constitution,146 the Nevada Constitution does not grant the Governor
significant appointment power of other principle executive officers.  In particu-
lar, article V of the Nevada Constitution provides for the independent elections
of the Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Treasurer, Controller, and the
Attorney General.147  This plural executive drastically weakens the Governor’s
power over the executive branch as these officers have a separate electoral
mandate and do not serve at the pleasure of the Governor.148  As is currently
the situation in Nevada, these officers may be of an opposing political party
with different partisan agendas or be simply recalcitrant.149  Although a plural
executive may create numerous opportunities for conflict, it furnishes a valua-
ble intrabranch check on state executive power.150
Weakening the Governor’s authority even further, the Nevada Constitu-
tion does not grant him the power of a line item veto; bills must be signed or
vetoed in their entirety.151  Currently, forty-four states provide their Governors
line item veto authority.152  Again, Nevada is in the minority as one of only six
states denying the Governor power to veto specific items in appropriations
bills.153  While the Line Item Veto Act of 1996 granted the President similar
item veto power, as discussed below, the Supreme Court struck down the stat-
ute as unconstitutional just two years later.154
The Nevada Constitution does parallel the U.S. Constitution in its creation
of a bicameral legislature.155  However, it is more dissimilar than similar in its
other terms regarding legislative authority.  Article IV, section 2 of the Nevada
Constitution provides that the Legislature is biennial, commencing on the first
Monday of February in odd-numbered years, and convenes for only 120 days,
resulting in a Legislature that is out of session more often than not.156  Another
significant difference is that the U.S Constitution limits federal legislative
144 BOWERS, supra note 68, at 47.
145 See NEV. CONST. art. V, §§ 1, 17, 19.
146 U.S. CONST. art II, § 2.
147 See NEV. CONST. art. V, §§ 17, 19.
148 BOWERS, supra note 68, at 78-79.
149 Id.; see also William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency?  Governors, State Attor-
neys General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2453 (2006)
(“In states where the Governor and the Attorney General are independently elected, the two
officers may come from different political parties with diametrically opposed partisan agen-
das.  If so, they can be expected to be in constant political opposition to each other.”).
150 Marshall, supra note 149, at 2451-55.
151 ELEANORE BUSHNELL & DON W. DRIGGS, THE NEVADA CONSTITUTION:  ORIGIN AND
GROWTH 115 (6th ed. 1984).
152 Gubernatorial Veto Authority with Respect to Major Budget Bill(s), http://www.ncsl.
org/programs/fiscal/lbptabls/lbpc6t3.htm#me (last visited Feb. 28, 2010).
153 Id.
154 See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448 (1998).
155 NEV. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
156 Id. § 2 (Nevada voters approved the 120-day limitation in the 1998 general election).
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power by enumerating the powers Congress does enjoy whereas the Nevada
State Legislature exercises plenary powers constrained only by enumerated
constitutional limitations.157
The Governor is granted a modicum of power in the state legislative pro-
cess as he retains the sole power to call the Legislature into special session.158
The Legislature itself lacks the power to do so.159  Although lacking authority
in other areas, the Governor’s position is strengthened during a special session
because the Legislature is restricted to exclusively transacting only the business
the Governor provides to them.160  Consequently, the inability of the Legisla-
ture to call itself into special session to respond to fiscal emergencies makes it
imperative an alternative solution exist.
V. INTERPRETING THE NEVADA CONSTITUTION:  A MIDDLE COURSE
The historical origins and textual dissimilarities between the Nevada State
Constitution and that of its national counterpart may affect the approach one
should use in its interpretation.161  The question of how state constitutions
ought to be interpreted has become a contentious problem for academia.162
Scholars disagree as to whether interpretation of state constitutions should be
analogous to the interpretation of similar provisions of the U.S. Constitution,
which is often referred to as “lockstep jurisprudence.”163  However, state courts
are under no obligation to follow federal precedent in interpreting analogous
state provisions that create the structure and operation of state government
because there is no federally mandated form of state government, nor is separa-
tion of powers required at the state level unless expressly provided for in the
state constitution.164
Opinions as to the relationship between state and national constitutional
law span a broad spectrum.165  At one end, scholars argue that national law
completely controls state constitutional law, requiring state judges follow
national law to determine the meaning of state constitutional provisions.166
This approach is problematic because in a federal system, the state maintains
some degree of independence and self-governance.167  Strict adherence to this
approach would “render the State rules a mere row of shadows.”168  At the
157 See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1-10; Nevadans for Nev. v. Beers, 142 P.3d 339, 345 (Nev.
2006); Moore v. Humboldt County, 232 P. 1078, 1080 (Nev. 1925).
158 BOWERS, supra note 68, at 74.
159 Id. (citing Nev. Op. Att’y Gen. 622 (1948)).
160 NEV. CONST. art. V, § 9.
161 See Tarr, supra note 135, at 329.
162 James A. Gardner, Whose Constitution Is It?  Why Federalism and Constitutional Posi-
tivism Don’t Mix, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245, 1245 (2005).
163 See Tarr, supra note 135, at 331.
164 Id. at 330.
165 Gardner, supra note 162, at 1265.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Robert F. Williams, State Courts Adopting Federal Constitutional Doctrine:  Case-By-
Case Adoptionism or Prospective Lockstepping?, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1499, 1525
(2005) (emphasis omitted) (citing State v. Bradberry, 522 A.2d 1380, 1389 (N.H. 1986)
(Souter, J., concurring)).
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other end of the spectrum, scholars deem that state constitutions are completely
independent of the U.S. Constitution and its interpretational precedents.169
Courts taking the latter approach often consult decisions from other jurisdic-
tions.170  This approach is reversely problematic, providing national constitu-
tional interpretations no weight, and treating federal precedents as entirely
external to the state provisions.171  The better approach is one equidistant from
both extremes.  Although state constitutional law is somewhat independent of
the national, it retains some dependency upon it.172  In addition, the language
of the Nevada Constitution often parallels that of other states and the U.S. Con-
stitution, providing a natural and logical argument justifying an examination
into the jurisprudence of both.  Therefore, this Note will discuss Nevada state
constitutional provisions in light of both national jurisprudence and similar
decisions from other jurisdictions.
Having identified an approach, there are additional presumptions to be
applied when the constitutionality of a Nevada statute is challenged.  When the
constitutionality of the Legislature’s enactment is questioned, it is presumed to
be constitutional and valid; the burden rests upon the challenger to prove it is
unconstitutional by a “clear showing of invalidity.”173  As stated earlier, stat-
utes regarding the same subject matter should also be read and “construed so as
to make each effective.”174
VI. DO THE GOVERNOR’S ACTIONS VIOLATE NEVADA’S SEPARATION OF
POWERS AND CONSTITUTE AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL DELEGATION OF
LEGISLATIVE POWER?
If Nevada’s non-unitary executive had not prevented the implementation
of the 2007 reserves and forced the Governor to seek approval for his reduc-
tions from the IFC, he would likely have been successful in making the reduc-
tions unilaterally pursuant to NRS section 353.225.  Additionally, backed by
the August 24, 2009 opinion of the Attorney General, it appears the Governor
will succeed in spending federal stimulus money without legislative involve-
ment.  Regardless of whether it’s determined that the Governor is violating
Nevada’s statutory law by attempting to make reductions and spend funds uni-
laterally, there is a strong argument that any unilateral reductions or spending
by the executive violates the bicameralism, presentment, and separation of
powers requirements of the Nevada Constitution.  Work program revisions,
regardless of whether they increase or decrease spending, are a change of the
budgetary law post enactment, and, as such, this delegation of legislative power
is constitutionally dubious.  As discussed later, although controversies pertain-
ing to NRS section 353.225 have come before the Nevada Supreme Court on
two separate occasions, the court has explicitly declined to address the question
169 Gardner, supra note 162, at 1265.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 1265-66.
172 Id. at 1266.
173 Castillo v. State, 874 P.2d 1252, 1259 (Nev. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).
174 City of Reno v. Stoddard, 167 P. 317, 322 (Nev. 1917) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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of the statute’s constitutionality.175  In comparison, the U.S. Supreme Court as
well as the high courts of several states have declared similar actions by head
executives as violative of their respective constitutions.176
A. Nevada Supreme Court Separation of Powers Case Law
Although the Nevada Supreme Court declined to consider the constitution-
ality of NRS section 353.225 governing reserves, it has made some telling
statements regarding the authority of the Governor over the state budget.177
State Employees Ass’n v. Daines involved a refusal by the Governor and the
Board of Examiners to implement a legislative bill appropriating funds for a
four percent salary increase for certain Nevada state employees.178  The court
observed that it was “well established that the power of controlling the public
purse lies within legislative, not executive authority.”179  Thus, the Governor
must be empowered by either the Nevada Constitution or by statute.180  The
court concluded that the Governor had no authorization, either statutory or con-
stitutional, to defer salary increases enacted by the Legislature.181  In support of
its decision, the court cited State v. Fairbanks in which the Supreme Court of
Alaska rejected a statute giving the Governor power to reduce the budget of
state agencies as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.182  The
Daines court also cited State ex rel. Holmes v. State Board of Finance in which
the New Mexico high court struck down a statute permitting the State Board of
Finance to reduce the annual operating budgets as violative of the separation of
powers doctrine.183  Moreover, the Daines court rejected the argument that the
Legislature intended NRS section 353.225 to delegate authority to the execu-
tive branch to invalidate the acts of the Legislature or that the Legislature
meant NRS section 353.225 to be an authorization for a “blanket repeal” of the
pay raise enacted by the Legislature.184  Rather, the court stated that the statute
was simply a means to provide flexibility to meet fiscal emergencies.185
Because the court finally determined NRS section 353.225 to be irrelevant to
the Daines case, it declined to consider the constitutional challenges to the
statute.186  The court’s choice of jurisdictions cited for issues regarding the
public purse may be indicative of how it will decide a future constitutional
challenge as both the Alaska and New Mexico courts strictly applied the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine.187
175 State Employees Ass’n v. Daines, 824 P.2d 276, 280 (Nev. 1992); State Employees
Ass’n v. State ex rel. ITS Dept. of Prisons, 724 P.2d 732, 733 (Nev. 1986).
176 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 436, 448 (1998).
177 Daines, 824 P.2d at 280; ITS Dept. of Prisons, 724 P.2d at 734.
178 Daines, 824 P.2d at 277.
179 Id. at 279.
180 See id. at 277-78.
181 Id. at 280.
182 Id. at 279 (citing State v. Fairbanks North Star Borough, 736 P.2d 1140 (Alaska 1987)).
183 Id. (citing State ex rel. Holmes v. State Bd. of Fin., 367 P.2d 925 (N.M. 1961)).
184 Id. at 280.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id. at 279.
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Further evidence that the Supreme Court of Nevada will apply a strict
construction is its decision in Commission on Ethics v. Hardy.188  Although not
addressing the precise issue herein, the Supreme Court of Nevada made clear
its position on Nevada’s Constitution and its separation of powers clause.  Spe-
cifically, the Hardy court addressed the ability of the Nevada Commission on
Ethics to conduct proceedings regarding ethical violations allegedly committed
by a Nevada senator.189  Although the Legislature created the Commission on
Ethics, the court determined it to be an agency of the executive branch.190
Because Article IV section 6 of the Nevada Constitution provides that any dis-
cipline of the Legislature “is a function constitutionally committed to each
house of the Legislature,” the court held that any delegation of such discipli-
nary power is an unconstitutional delegation in violation of the separation of
powers provision.191  Furthermore, the court recognized that the law does not
require states to incorporate the separation of powers doctrine into their consti-
tutions and stressed that Nevada has gone even further by expressly prohibiting
“any one branch of government from impinging on the functions of
another.”192  Consequently, this express prohibition supports the court’s finding
that “neither the Legislature nor the executive branch can agree to waive the
structural protections of separation of powers.”193  The court further stated,
“[T]he Legislature cannot, by enacting a statute that delegates certain powers to
another branch of the government, waive any separation of powers violation
inherent in such a delegation.”194  Accordingly, this strict construction of
Nevada’s separation of powers clause is indicative of how the court will likely
rule on the Governor’s power over the purse under NRS section 353.220 and
NRS section 353.225 should the issue come before it.
B. U.S. Supreme Court Separation of Powers Case Law
In 1996, Congress granted the President the power of line item veto in the
Line Item Veto Act.195  This act empowered the President to cancel three types
of provisions after they were signed into law:  “(1) any dollar amount of discre-
tionary budget authority; (2) any item of new direct spending; or (3) any lim-
ited tax benefit.”196  Precise procedures, such as notification to Congress within
five calendar days and a requirement that he first consider the purpose and
legislative history of the appropriation prior to its cancellation, constrained the
President when he was exercising this authority.197  Subsequently, an action
was brought before the Supreme Court challenging the statute’s constitutional-
ity on the grounds that it violated Article I of the U.S. Constitution by permit-
188 Comm’n on Ethics v. Hardy, 212 P.3d 1098 (Nev. 2009).
189 Id. at 1100.
190 Id. at 1101.
191 Id. at 1104, 1109.
192 Id. at 1103-04.
193 Id. at 1108.
194 Id. at 1109.
195 Line Item Veto Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200 (1996), invalidated by
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 421 (1998).
196 Clinton, 524 U.S. at 436 (internal quotation marks omitted).
197 Id.
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ting unilateral executive branch cancellation of previously enacted
provisions.198
Article I, Section 7 of the U.S. Constitution, known as the Presentment
Clause, provides for presidential veto power.199  If the President exercises his
veto, the Presentment Clause specifies for the return of the bill to Congress
prior to the bill becoming a law.200  The Constitution is silent on any unilateral
power of the President to amend or repeal parts of statutes that have been previ-
ously enacted.201  The Supreme Court in Clinton v. City of New York inter-
preted this silence to be strong evidence of an express prohibition.202
Examination of the historical record supports this argument.  For example,
George Washington interpreted the Presentment Clause as meaning he must
either “approve all the parts of a Bill, or reject it in toto.”203  Following this
interpretation, Presidents of the United States had not previously enjoyed line
item veto power or the power to amend statutes post enactment.  The power
granted in the 1996 statute was “not the product of the ‘finely wrought’ proce-
dure that the Framers designed”; rather, it was a design produced through mod-
ern convenience and compromise.204
Despite the proponents’ argument that the Line Item Veto Act, in practice,
resulted in the mere power to decline to spend money or to implement specific
tax measures, the Court held this Act actually empowered the President with
the ability to repeal laws, “for his own policy reasons, without observing the
procedures set out in Article I, § 7.”205  “Repeal of statutes, no less than enact-
ment, must conform with Art[icle] I.”206  The U.S. Constitution requires three
distinct steps be taken before a bill becomes a law:  1) the identical text must be
read and passed by each house; 2) the bill must then be presented to the Presi-
dent; and 3) the bill must be signed into law.207  If the text of the bill changes
during any of the three steps, the bill does not become a valid law.208  Because
the Line Item Veto Act authorized the President to create a law textually differ-
ent than that voted on by the Legislature and signed by the President, the Con-
stitution did not authorize the procedures and the Court held the Line Item Veto
Act invalid.209
An issue expressly omitted by the Court but addressed in Justice Ken-
nedy’s concurrence is the issue of the delegation of power between the
branches.210  “The Constitution’s structure requires a stability which transcends
198 Id. at 421.
199 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
200 Id.; Clinton, 524 U.S. at 439.
201 Clinton, 524 U.S. at 439.
202 Id.
203 Id. at 440 (quoting 33 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 96 (J. Fitzpatrick ed., 1940))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
204 Id.
205 Id. at 445.
206 Id. at 438 (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954 (1983)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
207 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7; Clinton, 524 U.S. at 448.
208 Clinton, 524 U.S. at 448.
209 Id.
210 Id. at 449 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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the convenience of the moment.”211  The framers designed the structure of the
Constitution’s separation of powers to prevent the concentration of power from
accumulating in the hands of a single branch, thereby putting liberty in harm’s
way.212  Although the Legislature did not intend the Line Item Veto Act as a
means to enhance the President’s power, its effect granted power beyond what
the framers had intended.213
The issue addressed in Clinton is analogous to Nevada’s current contro-
versy in many respects.  Like the President prior to the Line Item Veto Act,
Nevada’s Governors have not been granted any line item veto power.214  In
addition, the Nevada Constitution’s Presentment Clause is nearly identical to
that of the U.S. Constitution’s Article I, Section 7, requiring all bills having
passed the Legislature be presented to the Governor.215  Both require the chief
executive’s signature for enactment, and both provide the opportunity for his
veto of the bill in its entirety.216  The only significant difference appears to be
in the amount of time the chief executive has to consider the bill.  In Nevada,
the Governor has only five days; the President is granted ten.  In both cases,
failure to return the bill approved or vetoed within the respective timeframes
results in its enactment as law.217
The near identical text of these clauses leads to the reasonable conclusion
they should be interpreted similarly.  A Nevada budget is a law.218  Accord-
ingly, the Governor’s sweeping reductions or increases in spending are modifi-
cations of that law post-enactment.  Even if the courts determine that this
power has been explicitly delegated to the Governor by the Legislature, conve-
nience does not excuse a constitutional violation, nor does it justify the shifting
of power from one branch of government to the other.  Drafters of state consti-
tutions were equally wary of the accumulation of power in the hands of any one
group or person and cognizant of the danger it posed to liberty.219  As a result,
many state constitutions, including Nevada’s, have a much more rigid separa-
tion of powers clause than the U.S. Constitution, in which the separation of
powers must be inferred.220  Nevada’s explicit prohibition of any sharing of
duties between the branches makes the power of the Governor to reduce spend-
ing without legislative approval even more offensive to the Nevada Constitu-
tion.  Whether the result is broad across the board cuts, targeted reductions, or
increases of specific appropriations, such authority grants the Governor the
same overreaching power to modify the law based on his own policy and with-
out the requirements of the Presentment Clause.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 450.
213 Id.
214 BUSHNELL & DRIGGS, supra note 151, at 115.
215 Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, with NEV. CONST. art. IV, § 35.
216 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7; NEV. CONST. art. IV, § 35.
217 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7; NEV. CONST. art. IV, § 35.
218 NEV. CONST. art. IV, § 19.
219 Id. art. III, § 1; Tarr, supra note 135, at 337.
220 NEV. CONST. art. III, § 1; Tarr, supra note 135, at 337.
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Senator Coffin’s characterization of Governor Gibbons’s cuts as an exer-
cise of “unconstitutional line item veto” power was correct.221  Line item veto
authority theoretically encompasses the power to make cuts to every depart-
ment equally as well as individually.  Only by executive grace did the Governor
choose to propose a broad, across the board cut rather than inserting his own
policy discretion as to which specific programs or departments should be
required to reduce spending.  To his credit, in attempting to implement the cuts
without legislative approval, the Governor did not try to substitute his own
spending priorities for that of the Legislature’s.  However, the same cannot be
said of his unilateral spending of the ARRA federal stimulus money.
C. An Examination of Other State Positions
1. Alaska Supreme Court
Compellingly analogous to the issue at hand, and cited by the Daines
court, the State of Alaska experienced a similar revenue crisis in 1986, resulting
in a constitutional challenge to the Governor’s authority over budgetary law.222
Alaska Governor Bill Sheffield, relying on revenue projections provided to him
by the State’s Department of Revenue, submitted his proposed budget for fiscal
year 1987.223  Due to continually decreasing oil prices, the budget actually
passed by the Legislature was approximately $400 million less than that ini-
tially proposed by the Governor.224  Revenue projections continued to deterio-
rate and the Governor exercised his power of veto and further reduced
appropriations in an attempt to bring spending within projections of available
funds.225  The Governor’s veto reductions proved inadequate, and if left
unchanged, expenditures would have resulted in deficit spending, a situation
expressly prohibited by the Alaska Constitution.226  In response, the Governor
acted by announcing he would “withhold expenditure authority for certain
appropriations.”227  He failed to call the Legislature into special session and
unilaterally decreased the spending of certain agencies by up to fifteen percent,
while leaving others unaffected.228  The reductions totaled approximately $450
million.229
In addition to the powers vested in him by the Alaska Constitution, the
Governor relied upon Alaska Statutes (“AS”) section 37.07.080(g)(2) for his
authority to issue the reductions.230  This statute provided the Governor power
to order the withholding or reduction of appropriations if the Governor deter-
mined that:  “(1) the planned expenditures can no longer be made due to factors
221 Letter from Bob Coffin, Nev. State Senator, to Randolph Townsend, Nev. State Senator,
supra note 6.
222 State v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 736 P.2d 1140, 1141 (Alaska 1987); State Employ-
ees Ass’n v. Daines, 824 P.2d 276, 279 (Nev. 1992).
223 Fairbanks, 736 P.2d at 1141.
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 Id. at 1141-42.
229 Id. at 1142.
230 Id.
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outside the control of the state which make the expenditure factually impossi-
ble; or (2) estimated receipts and surpluses will be insufficient to provide for
appropriations.”231
The Alaska Supreme Court determined that AS section 37.07.080(g)(2)
was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power because it endowed the
Governor with unfettered power to amend the budget if revenue projections
were insufficient to fulfill appropriations.232  The statute failed because it gave
the Governor “sweeping power” over the budget in its entirety and failed to
restrain his changes or provide guidance.233
The Alaska court, recognizing the value of examining views taken by fed-
eral courts, noted the standard set forth Synar v. United States.234  The Synar
court stated that the constitutionality of a delegation of power from one branch
to another is determined by examining the scope of the power delegated and the
specificity of the standards required to execute the power.235  The greater the
scope of power, the more precise the standards in executing it must become.236
Constitutionality turns on whether the guidance sufficiently outlines the “field
within which the Administrator is to act so that it may be known whether he
has kept within it in compliance with the legislative will.”237  Therefore, the
Alaska Supreme Court recognized that broad delegation of power, similar to
the power granted in NRS section 353.220, would not be constitutional without
standards for precise execution.
The Alaska court’s holding is also significant because, in contrast to the
Nevada Governor who has no line item veto authority of appropriations bills,
the Alaska Governor has the power to veto any line item appropriation at any
level within a bill.238  Despite Alaskan Governors’ broad power over appropri-
ations prior to enactment, the court did not give deference to the Legislature in
providing him broad post-enactment authority.239
2. Applying Alaska and Federal Case Law to Nevada Statutes
Similar to the Alaska statute, NRS section 353.225 governing the setting
aside of reserves does not provide precise standards nor does it outline the field
within which the Governor should act when implementing reserves and reduc-
ing spending.240  In addition, the Governor’s interpretation that NRS section
353.220(5)(a) provides him with limitless discretionary authority to change
appropriations for the protection of life or property may fail for the same rea-
231 Id. at 1142 n.4.
232 Id. at 1143.
233 Id. at 1142-43.
234 Id. at 1143.
235 Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1386 (D.D.C. 1986) (per curiam), aff’d,
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
236 Id.
237 Id. at 1387 (quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1994)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
238 Gubernatorial Veto Authority with Respect to Major Budget Bill(s), supra note 152.
239 Fairbanks, 736 P.2d at 1142-43.
240 NEV. REV. STAT. § 353.225 (2007).
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son.241  The mere fact an intense controversy arose between key legislative
figures and the Governor gives support to the conclusion that both statutes are
lacking precision.  Applying the Synar test, NRS section 353.220 could be held
as a constitutional delegation of legislative power as it distinctly limits the Gov-
ernor’s changes of allotted funds to a maximum of 10% or $50,000, whichever
is less, despite the fact section (5)(a) contains some ambiguity as to what is
necessary “for the protection of life or property.”242  However, it is important
to note the different approach the U.S. Supreme Court took in Synar decided in
1986 and Clinton nearly twelve years later.243  In Synar, the Court struck down
the law as unconstitutional because the law gave one officer broad and unfet-
tered power to cut the budget without parameters, whereas in Clinton the law
was an impermissible delegation of legislative power to the executive
branch.244  If the Nevada court were to apply the Clinton rationale, as its deci-
sion in Hardy indicates it might, it may determine any authorization granted
the Governor over budgetary reductions is an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power despite the presence of specific guidelines.
3. Florida Supreme Court
The Supreme Court of Florida chose a lockstep approach following federal
precedents in determining the outcome of a similar challenge stemming from a
$621.7 million revenue shortfall.245  In 1991, Florida Governor Lawton Chiles
reacted to the shortfall by requiring departments to prepare plans to reduce their
operating budgets, which the state subsequently implemented.246  The statute at
issue provided that, if “in the opinion of the governor” a deficit in the General
Revenue Fund would occur, he shall certify so to the Administrative Commis-
sion247 who may then reduce all approved state agency budgets to prevent a
deficit.248  To determine the constitutionality of the statute, the Florida
Supreme Court looked to interpretation of the U.S. Constitution and the princi-
ples underlying separation of powers at the federal level.249
The Florida Constitution contains the same express separation of powers
clause as Nevada’s, prohibiting any person from one branch to exercise any
powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless expressly permitted
by the constitution.250  The court explained that this doctrine of separation of
powers encompasses two cardinal restrictions:  (1) “no branch may encroach
upon the powers of another”; and (2) “no branch may delegate to another
241 Id. § 353.220(5)(a); Press Release, Jim Gibbons, Governor of Nev., Governor Demands
Action to Get Stimulus Funds in the Hands of the People Now (August 21, 2009), available
at http://gov.state.nv.us/PressReleases/2009/PDF/PR-2009-08-21_StimulusIFC.pdf.
242 NEV. REV. STAT. § 353.220(4).
243 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714
(1986).
244 See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 465-66 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (citing Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 733).
245 Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, & F, 589 So.2d 260, 262 (Fla. 1991).
246 Id.
247 Id. at 263.  The Administrative Commission includes the Governor and Cabinet. Id. at
262 n.2.
248 Id. at 263.
249 Id.
250 FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3; NEV. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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branch its constitutionally assigned power.”251  To explain the rationale behind
such prohibitions, the court cited John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government:
“[t]he legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other hands;
for it being but a delegated power from the people, they who have it cannot
pass it over to others.”252  As is the case in Nevada, Florida appropriations are
law and, as such, the power to appropriate state funds lies solely with the Legis-
lature through duly enacted statutes.253  Similar to the U.S. Supreme Court’s
holding in Clinton, the Florida court held that the Legislature cannot delegate
by statute the authority to modify a law post enactment as it is “an impermissi-
ble attempt by the legislature to abdicate a portion of its lawmaking.”254  The
Florida court rejected the argument that reducing budgetary spending is not the
same as appropriating funds and stated that if Florida law grants the executive
branch the power to reduce, nullify, or change fiscal priorities, the legislative
power of appropriations is “totally abandoned.”255  However, the Florida court
did not ban all future attempts to provide Governors with flexibility, clarifying
that delegation of some duties may be permitted if there are sufficient guide-
lines to assure that the Governor follows legislative intent and clear parameters
are set for the Governor to operate within.256
4. Applying Florida Case Law to Nevada Statutes
The state constitution in Nevada is much the same as that in Florida.  Both
state constitutions require appropriations bills be enacted as law,257 and both
contain an express separation of powers clause.258  In fact, the provisions are
almost textually identical.259  It follows that the Nevada Supreme Court could
apply similar reasoning that the broad authorization to decrease or increase
spending is indeed violative of bicameralism and presentment, making the
Nevada statutes an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.
5. Other Approaches
Not all states have taken the approach held by the Alaska and Florida
courts.  Although arguably unconstitutional, some state courts have found dele-
gation of fiscal responsibilities to be an acceptable sharing of a necessary duty
arising because of the limited time the Legislature is in session and the com-
plexity of modern governments.260  In State ex rel. Schneider v. Bennett, the
Supreme Court of Kansas reviewed a challenge to a statute giving broad fiscal
power to the State Finance Council.261  Unlike Nevada, Kansas’s Constitution
lacks an express provision requiring the separation of powers, but it has repeat-
251 Chiles, 589 So. 2d at 264.
252 Id. (quoting JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 193 (Thomas I. Cook ed.,
Hafner Publishing Co. 1947) (1690)).
253 Id. at 264-65.
254 Id. at 267-68.
255 Id. at 265.
256 Id. at 268.
257 FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 1(c); NEV. CONST. art. IV, § 19.
258 FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3; NEV. CONST. art. III, § 1.
259 FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3; NEV. CONST. art. III, § 1.
260 State ex rel. Schneider v. Bennett, 547 P.2d 786, 791 (Kan. 1976).
261 Id. at 789.
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edly been inferred by Kansas courts.262  Recently however, the Kansas court
has altered its approach to the separation of powers doctrine, no longer enforc-
ing strict compliance with the theoretical doctrine.263  In its place, the court
applies a modified doctrine and denies that separation of powers has ever
purely existed except in political theory.264  The Kansas court determined that
“a strict application of the separation of powers doctrine is inappropriate today
in a complex state government” where circumstances require governmental
agencies to blend together legislative, judicial, and executive powers.265
Although the court invalidated several provisions of the Kansas statute for fail-
ure to provide adequate guidelines or legislative standards required for proper
delegation, its approach to the separation of powers doctrine was quite distinct
from that of the Alaskan and Florida high courts.266
It is difficult to determine which approach the Supreme Court of Nevada
would choose if and when this constitutional issue comes before it.  In Daines,
the court looked to states applying a stricter application of the separation of
powers doctrine.267  Furthermore, the court itself recently applied a strict sepa-
ration of powers interpretation in Commission on Ethics v. Hardy.268  Based on
these holdings, it is likely that the Nevada Supreme Court would reject the
more radical and modern approach of the Kansas courts due to Nevada’s
express separation of powers clause.  In an effort to avoid a constitutional cri-
sis, the Nevada Legislature could circumvent future conflicts through revision
of existing budgetary law.
VII. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
In light of the recent financial and housing crisis resulting in substantially
decreased state revenue, budgetary flexibility is important.  The rules governing
budget reductions and increases cannot be unworkable; adjustments must be
made when it becomes apparent that the budget is in danger of becoming
unbalanced.269  This problem is not unique and other states have responded by
providing various degrees of executive authority to cut an enacted budget.270
Potential constitutional violations, such as the one at issue, may be averted
through the enactment of proper legislation or by amending the Nevada Consti-
tution.  It is arguable a strict construction of separation of powers is unrealistic
with a biennial legislature.  However, there are many options available to the
Legislature to provide the Governor flexibility to meet fiscal emergencies that
are not violative of the Nevada Constitution.
The existing solution to combat the problem of a biennial legislative ses-
sion is the IFC.  As a legislative alternative, the IFC has been granted the
262 Id. at 790.
263 Id.
264 Id. at 790-91.
265 Id. at 791.
266 State ex rel. Schneider v. Bennett, 547 P.2d 786, 799-800 (Kan. 1976).
267 State Employees Ass’n v. Daines, 824 P.2d 276, 279 (Nev. 1992).
268 Comm’n on Ethics v. Hardy, 212 P.3d 1098, 1109 (Nev. 2009).
269 DIV. OF BUDGET & PLANNING, NEV. DEP’T OF ADMIN., supra note 3, at 2.
270 Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, Table 7-1:  Executive Authority to Cut the
Enacted Budget, September 2008, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=12589.
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authority to modify previously enacted legislative budgets.271  The IFC consists
of seven state senators and fourteen assemblymen.272  Although not discussed
in full here, the constitutionality of the IFC itself is dubious in that it is not fully
representative of the people and post-enactment modifications by a small group
of legislators arguably violates the bicameralism and presentment requirements
of the Nevada Constitution as well.  Continued conflicts between the Governor
and the IFC may result in the Governor bringing this issue before the Nevada
Supreme Court.
The Nevada Constitution prohibits deficit spending thereby creating a
need for the government to respond rapidly when there are impending
shortages.273  A significant obstacle to fiscal flexibility is the biennial nature of
Nevada’s State Legislature, making strict adherence to full legislative involve-
ment impracticable.  One obvious solution is to amend the Nevada Constitution
to provide the Legislature the power to call special sessions to respond to fiscal
emergencies or to provide more frequent regular sessions.  Unfortunately, in
2006, Nevada voters rejected an amendment that would have granted the Legis-
lature the ability to call special sessions274 and attempts to establish annual
sessions have likewise been unsuccessful.275  In addition, even if the Legisla-
ture had this authority, it might not use it.  Budget reductions are unpleasant
and legislators may be influenced by a reasonable concern that cutting certain
programs would anger their particular local electorate.  In contrast, the Gover-
nor’s electorate is the entire state; therefore, he may be better suited to make
objective decisions over the state’s fiscal troubles as he is less influenced by the
needs of one particular locale.
Even if successful in providing more direct legislative involvement, the
reality of creating a balanced budget in advance is that it will not remain so;
there will always be a deficit or a surplus.276  At least one state high court has
made an attempt to remedy this issue through a less than literal interpretation of
a similar constitutional provision requiring a balanced budget.277  The Court of
Appeals of New York recognized the Governor’s constitutional duty to propose
a balanced budget but disclaimed any constitutional obligation on the part of
the state to maintain a balanced budget.278  It is possible, however remote, the
Nevada Supreme Court could adopt a similar position relieving the Governor of
the burden to make revenues and expenditures match throughout the fiscal
year.279
271 See Nevada Legislature Interim Finance Committee, http://www.leg.state.nv.us/lcb/
interim.cfm (last visited Feb. 28, 2010).
272 Interim Finance Committee (NRS 218.6825), http://www.leg.state.nv.us/74th/Interim/
Interim/ifc/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2010).
273 DIV. OF BUDGET & PLANNING, NEV. DEP’T OF ADMIN., supra note 3, at 2.
274 Initiative & Referendum Inst., Election Results 2006, BALLOTWATCH, Nov. 2006, http://
www.iandrinstitute.org/BW%202006-5%20(Election%20results).pdf.
275 PATRICK GUINAN & MICHAEL J. STEWART, FACT SHEET:  A BRIEF HISTORY ON THE
COMMENCEMENT AND LENGTH OF NEVADA’S LEGISLATIVE SESSIONS, (2009), http://www.leg.
state.nv.us/lcb/research/FactSheets/Commencement_Length_Sessions.pdf.
276 In re Oneida County v. Berle, 404 N.E.2d 133, 136 (N.Y. 1980).
277 See id.
278 Id.
279 See id.
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Perhaps the best solution is an amendment to the Nevada Constitution to
grant the Governor the power of line item veto.  A majority of states have
found this to be an effective means of dealing with legislatures that are out of
session more often than not.280  As discussed above, the disadvantage of grant-
ing the Governor line item veto power is that it permits him to substitute his
spending priorities for that of the Legislature.  To alleviate this concern, a con-
stitutional amendment could be specifically tailored and constrained by supple-
mentary statutory law permitting the Governor to make only broad
nondiscriminatory reductions in spending.281  Currently ten states have done so
either through their constitution or by statute.282  This solution permits the
Governor to make necessary adjustments while preserving the integrity of the
Legislature’s fiscal priorities.
The Legislature could also revise existing statutes to provide the Governor
authorization to increase or cut particular programs, while protecting certain
programs from across the board cuts.  For example, Alabama permits the Gov-
ernor to unilaterally make reductions but excludes particular programs, such as
the School for the Deaf and Blind and the Department of Youth Services.283
Similarly, nine other states provide Governors unilateral discretion to make
across the board reductions to appropriations under certain enumerated condi-
tions.284  Although it is probable NRS section 353.220, the statute governing
revisions, will withstand a constitutional challenge because it sufficiently
details the parameters within which the Governor must operate, it is likely the
general reserve provision in NRS section 353.225 would not.  The Legislature
should draft guidelines into NRS section 353.225 providing clear criteria and
frameworks alleviating doubt and uncertainty as to the legislative intent and
authority of the Governor to demand reserves.
The Legislature should also close the loophole that exists between NRS
section 353.225 (Reserves) and Assembly Bill 628 in future appropriations
bills.285  The legislative approval requirements of Assembly Bill 628 and its
successor, Assembly Bill 562, appear to be triggered only when certain criteria
have been met, and when read in conjunction with NRS section 353.225, the
latter appears to be a general statute that provides the Governor the power to
order agencies to set aside reserves “for operation and maintenance of the vari-
ous departments, institutions and agencies.”286  While NRS section 353.225 is
an important mechanism providing flexibility for fiscal emergencies, greater
statutory standards in exercising this delegated authority would help alleviate
280 Ronald K. Snell, Annual and Biennial Budgeting:  The Experience of State Govern-
ments, http://www.ncsl.org/Default.aspx?TabId=12658#point4 (last visited Feb. 28, 2010);
Gubernatorial Veto Authority with Respect to Major Budget Bill(s), supra note 152; Nat’l
Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 270.
281 Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 270.
282 Id.
283 Id.
284 Id.
285 In 2009, the same language was adopted in the Budget Act governing fiscal years July 1,
2009 to June 30, 2010 and July 1, 2010 to June 30, 2011.  Assem. 562 § 64, 2009 Leg., 75th
Gen. Sess. (Nev. 2009).
286 NEV. REV. STAT. § 353.225 (2007).
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future conflict and fulfill the Legislature’s intent to control the setting aside of
significant reserves.
VIII. CONCLUSION
A constitutional crisis is brewing and the potential for problems will
remain until either the matter is settled by the Nevada Supreme Court, or appro-
priate revisions to existing law are made.  Although Governor Gibbons chose to
follow the nonbinding opinion provided to him by the Attorney General regard-
ing budget cuts, a legal loophole remains open.  Also, unless the Legislature
revises state law to prohibit it, the current Governor, as well has his successors,
may continue to bypass legislative involvement when spending federal stimulus
money.  Consequently, as the law currently stands, efforts by future Governors
to exploit these deficiencies are likely to succeed.  Such success will result in
changes to budgetary law post enactment and is violative of Nevada’s express
separation of powers clause.
